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MISUSED CONCEPTS AND MISGUIDED QUESTIONS:
FUNDAMENTAL CONFUSIONS IN FAMILY LAW DEBATES
by James G. Dwyer
1
Autonomy and privacy are common terms in family law discourse. Many of the
most popular family law scholarship topics are characterized as posing the
question whether the state should regulate or intervene in family relationships,
an action viewed as infringing on autonomy or privacy or both. Those who
argue in favor of greater parental control over children's lives, or greater free-
dom for parents in the way they treat their children, typically speak of regula-
tion and intervention in a pejorative manner and ostensibly stand opposed to
them and in favor of what they call "parental autonomy," "family autonomy,"
and "family privacy." Even those who would like to see state agencies more
aggressively protect weaker parties in family relationships against more power-
ful persons in those relationships use the terms regulation and intervention in a
way implying that non-regulation and nonintervention are possible and, in fact,
constitute the default state of affairs. They view state regulation of or interven-
tion in the family as a departure from a natural-that is, state-free-situation.
They differ from those who characterize themselves as anti-regulation by
arguing in favor of such a departure.
Yet autonomy and privacy and their attendant concepts are almost always
inappropriate in a family law context, and the question whether the state should
regulate family relationships is a nonsensical one.2
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF REGULATION AND INTERVENTION
The question of regulation or intervention most often arises today in discussing
parent-state conflicts over child rearing-for example, what the content or
manner of schooling will be or what medical treatment children will receive.3
1 Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law, Williamsburg,
Virginia.
2 Fran Olsen made this point about intervention more thoroughly and elegantly over a
quarter century ago. See Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFoRM 835 (1985). I think it bears repeating, so here I offer my own clumsy
articulation.
3 I lump together intervention and regulation even though their precise meanings might not
be co-extensive. In ordinary usage, we tend to think of regulation as a limit on freedom, a
disruption of what people would otherwise do, whereas intervention we use more broadly to
include not just limits or disruption but also bringing people together. Thus it makes sense
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But the question whether the state should regulate family relationships can also
arise in connection with legal rules, actual or proposed, that would direct
adults' behavior in intimate relationships with each other. At one time, arrest
and prosecution for domestic violence constituted a new and striking interven-
tion into the marital relationship.4 Further, some might even describe legal rules
concerning the initial formation of family relationships-for example, paren-
tage or marriage laws-as intervention in private life. In all these contexts,
however, thinking about the legal or political questions as posing a choice
between regulation or non-regulation, intervention or nonintervention, is the
wrong way to think about them.
A. The Conceptual Impossibility of the Absence of State
Intervention in the Formation of Legal Family Relationships
It is routinely overlooked, but obvious once stated, that there is no such thing as
a legal relationship between adults or between an adult and a child without state
intervention-that is, without an action by and involvement of the state that
amounts to coming between the two persons to bind them in a certain way. The
state is the source of laws, and it confers legal statuses and creates legal
relationships.
This is true of business relationships as well, but it should be even clearer in
the case of family relationships. A legal business partnership might exist by
virtue of a contract even if the parties do not record it with a state agency, and
yet at the same time it is a legal relationship only because the state stands ready
to enforce that contract. Against the backdrop of state-generated laws about the
significance of executing a business contract, entering into the contract creates
a relationship entailing legal duties, rights, liabilities, and so forth. In the case
to say, for example: "They didn't know how to go about meeting, so I intervened." Whereas
saying "... so I regulated" seems inapt. Etymologically, intervene derives from the Latin
words inter (between) and venire (to come), regulate from the Latin regulare (to control by
rule, direct). In the family law context of primary significance in this paper-that is, state
control over interactions and exercise of power within established legal family relation-
ships-either term is fitting. It is equally consistent with common usage to characterize
child maltreatment law and child protection agency operations, for example, either as state
intervention in or as state regulation of the parent-child relationship.
4 See Shelley M. Santry, Penny Wise But Pound Foolish in the Heartland: A Case Study of
Decriminalizing Domestic Violence in Topeka, Kansas, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 223, 229
(2012). ("When English colonists settled in North America, they brought the principles and
rationales of English common law with them. Under these principles, family autonomy and
privacy were paramount, and the judiciary was loathe to intervene unless the husband's
actions exceeded the bounds of 'moderate chastisement."')
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of legal family relationships, state involvement in their formation is typically
clearer, because the formation is usually memorialized in a state-issued docu-
ment containing the names of the parties and providing proof of the state's
recognition: marriage certificates, birth certificates, adoption decrees, and guar-
dianship orders.
It would clearly be a mistake, then, for anyone to speak about formation of
legal marriages or legal parent-child relationships in a way that suggests state
nonintervention is a possibility. Some might be tempted to do so when the state
makes or is urged to make a nontraditional choice, such as conferring the legal
status of a parent on someone other than a biological parent or on more than
two persons for a single child. The normality or seeming naturalness of two
biological parents acquiring the status of a legal parent might fool people into
thinking that it does not involve any legal action, whereas for the state to assign
legal parenthood to surrogacy contractors or a birth mother's husband who is
not the biological father appears as a kind of social engineering that requires
special justification. But that would be a mistake; traditional parentage laws are
also state action coming between private persons in a rather dramatic fashion.
That fact has impressed me each of the three times I have left a hospital with a
newborn child in my custody. For the state to confer the status of parent on one
adult rather than another has dramatic, life-determining consequences for a
child. It is crucial to recognize that it is so, because only if we recognize the
state's central role in creating legal parent-child relationships can we ever hold
the state accountable for how it carries out this function, which it arguably does
quite poorly, insofar as it confers legal parent status on many people who are
patently incapable of caring properly for a child.5
Indeed, with respect to parent-child relationships, the state also comes close
to creating the social relationship as well as a legal one, because it attaches to
the legal status that it confers on parents a presumptive entitlement to possess,
or at least regularly associate with, a child. Most legal parents exploit that
entitlement to create a social relationship with the child.6 Other adults who
5 See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment of
Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 442-46 (2008); James G. Dwyer,
A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and Newborn Persons, 56 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 755, 766-69 (2009).
6 See, e.g., 13 DEL. CODE § 70 1(a) ("The father and mother are the joint natural guardians
of their minor child and are equally charged with the child's support, care, nurture, welfare
and education. Each has equal powers and duties with respect to such child ..."); FLA. STAT.
§ 744.301(1) ("The parents jointly are the natural guardians of their own children and of
their adopted children, during minority"); 19-A ME. REV. STAT. § 1651 ("The father and
mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor children and are jointly entitled to the
care, custody, control, services and earnings of their children"). A nuance in the law of
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might want to create a personal relationship with the child can be easily denied
the opportunity if they do not have the legal status of parent; those to whom the
state gives that status generally receive considerable power of control over the
child's social interactions. 7 This is not to say that no social parent-child rela-
tionships arise without legal recognition and status; nonlegal-parent caregivers
are common. But with respect to the great majority of children, adults assume
the caregiver role after receiving state-conferred status and relying on it to
claim possession of, or at least some time with, the child. In contrast, the social
dimension of adult relationships initially arises without overt state action (for
example, dating), and state conferral of legal status (such as registered partner-
ship or marriage) is not the practical basis for continuing the social relationship;
legal marriage today does not entail any right to the other spouse's association
nor, correspondingly, any duty on the part of spouses to live with or even spend
time with each other.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that the state regulates or intervenes
in individuals' personal lives even when it refuses to create a legal family rela-
tionship between them, or refuses to give legal recognition to the social family
relationship they have formed or would like to form. This is so because in that
case the state still applies a set of rules to the interactions between those people,
simply a set of rules that differs from that pertaining to the legal family rela-
tionship. This other set of rules influences the course of the individuals'
relationship with each other. For example, denying legal marriage status to
same-sex couples amounts to insisting that legal rules governing non-spouses
apply to them. That could be rules the state has created for a similar special
relationship, in jurisdictions that recognize civil unions or domestic partner-
some states that drives this reality home is the disparate treatment of birth mother and
biological father when they are not married to each other; whereas the mother is auto-
matically a natural guardian with a right of custody, the biological father might have to pass
a fitness or best-interest test before receiving custody. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 9-27-342(a)
("Absent orders of a circuit court or another court of competent jurisdiction to the contrary,
the biological mother, whether adult or minor, of an illegitimate juvenile is deemed to be
the natural guardian of that juvenile and is entitled to the care, custody, and control of that
juvenile"); FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) ("The mother of a child born out of wedlock is the
natural guardian of the child and is entitled to primary residential care and custody of the
child unless the court enters an order stating otherwise"); OKLA. STAT., Tit. 10, § 7800
("Except as otherwise provided by law, the mother of a child born out of wedlock has
custody of the child until determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction"); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 63-17-20(B) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, the custody of an illegiti-
mate child is solely in the natural mother unless the mother has relinquished her rights to
the child").
7 See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 50-53, 62-67 (2006).
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ships. Or it could be rules applicable to any two or more persons who cohabit,
or the rules that pertain to complete strangers. Regardless of what the available
alternative statuses are relative to legal marriage, some alternative set of legal
rules will apply to members of social relationships and those rules might have
practical (for example, pertaining to rights in property acquired during
cohabitation) or symbolic significance that has a real impact on the relation-
ships. In short, by refusing one form of regulation, the state incidentally
imposes another.
B. The Impossibility of Non-Regulation or Nonintervention
Once the State Creates Legal Family Relationships
The most common context, though, in which scholars, judges, and others consi-
der whether the state may or should regulate or intervene is parental control
over child rearing.8 I have already suggested one false assumption: that the
default situation for child rearing is nonintervention. When the state creates
legal parent-child relationships, it confers various rights and powers on the
persons to whom it gives the legal status of parent. I mentioned earlier the right
of custody. In fact, one would think there is little point in conferring the legal
status of parent or any other in a family relationship unless there are some
rights, powers, and duties connected to it. The fundamental-rights case for state
conferral of legal marriage status on any particular type of couple is continually
becoming less clear precisely because there is increasingly less practical import
to its doing so. Now it is largely a matter of only state-conferred financial
benefits. 9
The state actually attaches to the status of legal parent not only a presump-
tive right of custody, but also presumptive rights to control many important
aspects of children's lives, such as their education and medical care, and
permission to act toward a child in various ways that otherwise would be
' See, e.g., Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after Troxel v. Granville, 2000
SuP. CT. REV. 279, 296 (2000) ("courts should forbid state intervention that burdens
parental autonomy unless the intervention is necessary to prevent serious harm the state has
special competence to assess"); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist
Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 1014 (1996) (arguing against "state educational inter-
vention" as an unwarranted incursion on parents' rights); Michael S. Wald, State Interven-
tion on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards For Removal of Children From Their
Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental
Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976).
9 Cf. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005) (holding on the basis of Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), that the state's anti-fornication law was unconstitutional).
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prohibited, such as physically carrying a child into one's home, using physical
restraint or corporal punishment to alter a child's behavior, removing a child's
clothing, and other common aspects of parenting.
10
Because these are all powers, rights, and permissions (or liberties) that the
state confers along with the legal status of parent, the default situation for par-
ents as a matter of positive law is actually one of quite robust state intervention.
It resembles the state's creation of legal guardianships over incompetent adults,
a case in which people more readily recognize the state's heavy involvement
even when it amounts to guardians' being free to act as they wish. For example,
if a guardian places a ward in a particular living situation, authorizes or refuses
medical care, or enrolls the ward in some training program, we appreciate that
the guardian does these things by virtue of extraordinary powers conferred on
him or her by the state, powers that private persons ordinarily do not have over
other private persons, and to that extent the state is intervening quite profoundly
in the life of the person who is under guardianship. We see this too with
guardianship over children, commonly conferred on substitute parent figures; a
grandmother or aunt might be able legally to make educational choices for a
child because the state has overtly placed her in a guardianship role and
attached that power to the role.
Perhaps what makes us more cognizant of the state's substantial intervention
in the lives of dependent persons in the case of guardianship is (a) that it is less
common and (b) that it involves individualized judicial or administrative state
decision making. But the fact that legal parents typically derive their powers,
rights, and privileges from statutory provisions covering thousands of cases all
at once and without individualized scrutiny, rather than from a court order
pertaining just to each one of them, does not at all change the fact that the state
is giving parents those powers, rights, and privileges, and so the state is inter-
vening in the life of a private, dependent person (in this case, a child) in a
profound way. Both with guardianship and with legal parenthood, the resulting
legal power of one private party over another rests entirely upon an action of
the state. This becomes even clearer when we recognize the absence of such
powers and permissions for other adults who might wish to have a say in how a
child is raised. Neighbors who think they might do better raising a certain child
would commit a crime by taking possession of the child. And they would have
no ability to change the child's enrollment to a different school; school officials
would simply ignore them.
Thus, it is a common misconception, when parents and the state battle in
court over some law or state action that separates parents from children or
10 See supra, note 6.
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restricts parental power over some aspect of children's lives (for example,
education, medical care, or discipline), that what parents want is for the state to
leave them alone and that state nonintervention is a possible outcome. In fact,
what parents want is for the state to confer more complete power on them.
They ask the state to invest the legal status of parent with plenary, rather than
limited, legal power over children's lives. At the extreme, they seek a state-
conferred monopoly over the child's intellectual formation and physical dev-
elopment. Speaking of this parent-state conflict as a battle over intervention is
therefore a gross mischaracterization that creates an entirely false impression.
In fact, it would be equally plausible (or, better, equally implausible) to
characterize some laws by which the state directs certain aspects of a child's
life, such as laws mandating vaccinations, as state inaction. One could say that
the state is refraining from extending to parents a particular legal power-
namely, the power to decide whether a child receives vaccinations.11 Obvi-
ously, vaccination laws are not actually an instance of state inaction; the state
acted to pass those laws. But at the same time the state did not do something
else-that is, include the decision whether to vaccinate in the power it confers
on legal parents. The point here is that with child rearing the state must always
do one thing or another, dictate certain things itself or assign legal power over
those things to parents or other private parties, and it makes no sense to
characterize the state's choice between those two options as posing the question
whether to intervene or regulate. The appropriate question, rather, is how the
state will intervene or regulate child rearing-by specifying itself what must
happen, by delegating that power to a private party, or by some combination of
those two things (for example, by conferring power but establishing a range of
permissible choices).
Similarly, although eliminating coverture was at the time likely regarded as
a dramatic state intervention into the marital relationship, today we see it as the
ending of an especially insidious and heavy-handed form of state involvement
in the marital relationship-namely, conferring on one person in a family
relationship extraordinary power over the life of the other person in that rela-
tionship. 12 The normality of husbands' power over wives and over all family
wealth undoubtedly made it seem to most people (including wives) a natural
state of affairs, and the state's posture one of simply recognizing and declining
11 In fact, nearly all states do gratuitously grant this power to parents who have a religious
objection to vaccinations, and some grant it to a broader class of parents. See Children's
Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Religious Exemptions from Healthcare for Children, http://
childrenshealthcare.org/?page id=24#Exemptions
12 See Claudia Zaher, When a Woman's Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A
Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459 (2002).
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to disturb the natural order. But in hindsight we see that coverture actually
constituted a severe state incursion into women's lives, removing from them
rights and immunities they possessed before the state conferred the legal status
of marriage on them. Nevertheless, ending coverture was not a matter of the
state's ending its intervention into and regulation of the lives of married people;
it was, rather, substitution of a different form of intervention and regulation.
Mischaracterizing as state intervention the state's refusal to give parents
greater power over children is rhetorically effective, because we generally
regard state intervention as unwelcome interference requiring special justifica-
tion. The mischaracterization creates the impression that the burden of persua-
sion belongs to those who believe the state should give parents less power.
"State intervention," like "surgical operation," sounds like a disruption of
normal life that is at best unfortunate. In the ordinary course of their lives,
autonomous adults do not need overt state action to carry on as they wish in
their interactions with each other, and so we assume the state has to justify any
restrictions it imposes on adults' freedoms. Further, we tend as a general matter
to extend our manner of thinking about interactions among autonomous adults
to our interactions with all other creatures. Perhaps we do this because it is
epistemologically economical not to have to retool normatively and conceptu-
ally when shifting our gaze from adult interactions-historically the focus of
our normative reasoning-to interactions with non-autonomous persons.
Perhaps we do so also or instead simply because autonomous adults have
always been able to do so. They have always been in a position of power
relative to the non-autonomous and so have felt no practical compulsion to
develop an additional way of thinking or set of principles that is sensitive to
any differences in the characteristics of different groups of people, or to any
differences in interactions with non-autonomous persons.
But that is all quite unprincipled. The very point of jurisprudence and of
moral reasoning is to think and act in a more rationally consistent and prin-
cipled way. Today we feel a moral compulsion to do right by weaker persons
even in the absence of a practical compulsion to do so. And that entails
recognizing that normative assumptions underlying our attitude toward state
involvement in relationships between autonomous adults might not carry over
rationally to relationships between autonomous adults and non-autonomous
persons. It entails a responsibility to accept that a quite different moral frame-
work might be fitting for thinking about the state's role in the lives and
relationships of non-autonomous persons, including possibly a framework in
which the state has presumptive decision-making power, pursuant to its parens
patriae role, and justification is necessary for the state to confer any of this
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power on private parties or to bestow special behavioral privileges on certain
autonomous persons in their dealings with non-autonomous persons. 
13
Advocates for greater protection of children's welfare against harmful par-
ental choices or actions therefore make a strategic error in accepting interven-
tion and regulation as the terms of debate. They should insist on framing
parent-state conflicts over child rearing in terms of how the state will allocate
power over children's lives and whether the state will confer more or less
control and freedom on legal parents. Or in terms of how the law can best serve
children's welfare or effectuate the rights of children in making relationship
choices in their behalf and in imbuing authority into the roles any private
parties play in children's lives.
It is important also to be mindful that even in connection with relationships
between autonomous persons, the state's posture is not one of nonintervention.
There are laws in place setting limits on interpersonal conduct (for example,
prohibiting violence) and establishing consequences for particular interpersonal
acts (for example, promises). Put simply, in a society governed by law, the state
operates in all human interactions.
All this is easier to see if we contemplate what it would really mean for the
state not to regulate or intervene at all in family relationships. I noted above
that it is conceptually impossible for the state not to be involved in creation of
legal family relationships. Is it conceptually possible for the state to leave such
relationships unregulated after creating them? Or to leave social relationships
that bear no special legal status unregulated? If so, is it practically possible?
One thing it might mean for the state not to regulate family relationships at
all would be for the state not to create any special legal rules for such relation-
ships. It is not conceptually impossible for a new state-conferred status to be
purely nominal, having no practical significance. So the state might record
marriages but not have any marriage laws, just as it might have no special laws
for dating or friendships. Similarly, the state might record parental status but
have no laws relating to parenting. Entrance into either relationship would then
work no change in the legal powers, immunities, rights, and duties that anyone
has.
Imagining this possibility illuminates the innumerable ways in which par-
ents and intimate partners benefit from the particular form that state interven-
tion in their family relationships currently takes. Were there no special legal
rules for family relationships, biological parents would have no authoritative
claim to possession of their offspring and no basis for invoking the state's
assistance in preventing their offspring from being carried off by others; their
13 See James G. Dwyer, Who Decides, in Colin Macleod & Alexander Bagattini, eds., THE
WELLBEING OF CHILDREN IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Springer, forthcoming 2013).
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legal position vis-A-vis the child would be no different from that of any other
adults. Even if birth parents managed to hold on to their young, third parties
could intrude to discipline, instruct, or give medicine to a child without the
parents having any legal recourse; absent conferral by the state of substantial
powers on the status of legal parent, parents would have no legal basis qua
parents for complaint about these things and therefore no ability to call on the
power of the state to protect their interest in custody and control. 14 Clearly,
then, absence of special rules for parent-child relationships is not something
that parents or advocates for greater parental control over children's lives want.
In reality, though, what I have just described-that is, a regime in which the
state creates no special substantive rules for family relationships-is not actu-
ally a condition of non-regulation of those relationships. There would still be all
the legal rules that today govern interactions among people who are not in a
family relationship with each other. Especially relevant to parent-child interac-
tions would be rules prohibiting kidnapping, physical restraint, and battery.
Thus, in the absence of special regulations for parent-child relationships, not
only would biological parents have no basis for claiming the state's assistance
in preventing others from taking possession of their offspring, but they also
would not be legally free to assume custody and engage in common parenting
behaviors themselves.
Given that mere elimination of special rules does not actually amount to
non-regulation, we have to look for a more extreme departure from the status
quo to get to a condition of non-regulation. Real non-regulation would appear
to require a condition of lawlessness-that is, absence of any laws governing
people who form or desire family-like relationships, in terms of their interac-
tions with and control over each other. In that condition, parents would have no
legal rights or powers vis-A-vis their children, but also no duties (positive or
negative) or liabilities. Spouses likewise would not be constrained legally in
their conduct toward each other if the state truly did not regulate family rela-
tionships. Quickly we see that nonintervention in this sense is utterly unattrac-
tive and unlike what any sane person seriously recommends.
And in fact, even that scenario does not go far enough to create a situation of
true nonintervention. For it to be the case that only family relationships and no
others exist in a legal vacuum, the state would have to pass laws that establish
when people are in fact in a family, so as to remove from only those people and
in connection with only those relationships the legal protections that those
14 Such actions by other adults might violate some right the state has given the child, but the
biological parents would have no standing to act as agent for the child in enforcing those
rights, and in any event the biological parents' own wishes regarding the child's upbringing
would be legally irrelevant.
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people enjoyed before the state applied that prescription to them. There would
still, then, be a form of state intervention into the lives of persons because of
their having social relationships that the state regards as family relationships.
The state would intervene in their lives at some point in their interactions
precisely to remove from them certain rights and duties they would otherwise
have.
To establish a situation of lawlessness within social family relationships
while avoiding such singling out for withdrawal of legal rights, the state would
have to eliminate all laws governing personal interactions. Only if all persons,
regardless of relationship, operate in a condition of lawlessness can we truly
say that the state is not regulating or intervening in family relationships. It
should require no further elaboration to make plain that true state noninterven-
tion in family-like relationships is not something any rational person could
endorse. It would mean the collapse of civilization and possibly make family
life in any recognizable form impossible. As such, arguably, it is conceptually
impossible for the state not to regulate or intervene in ongoing family relation-
ships, because true non-regulation and nonintervention would mean destruction
of the social conditions that make social family relationships possible.
Thus, judges, scholars, politicians, and others err when they frame debates
over the law of child rearing or the law of spousal relations as posing the
question whether the state should intervene and regulate. The question actually
before them is how the state should regulate family relationships, given the
inevitability of the state's regulating and intervening in one form or another in
all human relationships.
15
15 Relatedly, participants in such debates and legal disputes likewise err when they charac-
terize as embodiments of a negative-rights jurisprudence the constitutional doctrines in the
United States and elsewhere relating to the parentage rights of birth parents and the power
of existing legal parents to control particular details of children's upbringing. The reality is
that such court decisions confer positive rights on parents, including in some contexts (e.g.,
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), holding that parents' substantive due process rights
require the state presumptively to give effect to their wishes regarding a child's contact with
grandparents) just the sort of right to state protection against intrusion by other private
parties that the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to confer on maltreated children (e.g.,
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), holding that chil-
dren have no constitutional right to state protection against a parent whom the state knows
to be abusive) and victims of domestic violence (Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748 (2005), holding that domestic violence victims have no constitutional right to the
state's assistance in avoiding contact with their abusers).
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C. Does Inevitable Mean Unconstrained?
Even though the state must intervene in and regulate family relationships, we
can still demand justification from the state for the particular form of interven-
tion and regulation it chooses. In particular, its intervention into the lives of
children to the extraordinary extent of making choices for them about the for-
mation of family relationships and then bestowing on certain adults substantial
decision-making powers over them and numerous privileges (including, in the
United States, the privilege to hit them) requires special justification.
The only plausible justification for going so far beyond mere protection
against harms is the state's parens patriae authority and duty to protect the
well-being of non-autonomous persons.1 6 Because this is the only justification,
the state may go no further in conferring on other persons power over chil-
dren's lives than that parens patriae justification warrants. Correspondingly,
the state may not aim to serve the interests of any other private parties,
including parents, in carrying out this form of intervention, nor any collective
societal aims, such as diversity or racial equality. This is the view taken for
granted in connection with the state's creating and regulating guardianships for
incompetent adults. As with such guardianships, the state must be viewed as
occupying a purely fiduciary role when it acts to create, regulate, or dissolve
parent-child relationships. The state may not take advantage of an incompetent
adult's incapacity to use that adult's life to serve the interests of other private
parties or to serve collective aims-the state's power over children should be
similarly restricted.
Accordingly, to the extent that legislatures or courts making decisions con-
cerning parentage or central aspects of children's lives such as education have
aimed even in part to protect adults' interests-which they do whenever they
speak of balancing parents' interests or rights against the state aim of promo-
ting children's welfare-or have in effect sacrificed children's welfare, they
have breached a fiduciary duty owed to children and violated children's funda-
mental (negative) rights. Many cases of disrupted adoption that reach the courts
provide good illustrations of this breach of fiduciary duty, insofar as even in the
most child-friendly decisions the courts endorse a balancing of the child's
interests against those of biological parents,17 and in the worst cases they
effectively treat the children as non-human possessions. 18
16 See Dwyer, supra note 7, at 195-99.
17 See, e.g., Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 369, 374-77 (Minn. 2002).
1" See, e.g., In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994) (Baby Richard case) (ordering that a
four-year-old boy be extracted from his adoptive family of four years and conveyed to a
biological father he had never met, reasoning: "the appellate court, wholly missing the
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II. MISUSE OF NICE-SOUNDING TERMS AND CONCEPTS
In modem western, liberal societies, autonomy connotes an important value, for
some the most important value. For scholars and others influenced by Kantian
moral and political philosophy, above all else the state and individual moral
agents must respect individuals' autonomy. 19 Claiming to be pro-autonomy
therefore makes one presumptively correct in one's views, and many partici-
pants in family law debates characterize their positions as resting on or
respecting autonomy.20
Privacy is also an important value in our culture. The term actually has sev-
eral meanings, as reflected in the variety of doctrinal strains in constitutional
law relating to the right of privacy. 21 In the family law context, it is most often
given the meaning of insulation from regulation. In that sense, it is more or less
equivalent to the concept of non-regulation, which, as explained earlier, is prac-
tically and perhaps conceptually impossible in regard to human relationships.
In this section, I will point out additional problems with its use in family law
scholarship.
Both autonomy and privacy are routinely misused by scholars, legal actors,
and the general public in discussing family law topics. Those terms are in fact
entirely inapt in most family law contexts. This is so principally because most
family law issues do not involve a single person, nor do they involve conflicts
in which there is, on one side, the state or some other entity outside the family
and, on the other side, family members who are all autonomous or whose
interests are perfectly unified. The family issues that produce litigation or
threshold issue in this case, dwelt on the best interests of the child. Since, however, the
father's parental interest was improperly terminated, there was no occasion to reach the
factor of the child's best interests. That point should never have been reached and need
never have been discussed").
19 It is unclear that Kant thought anyone has an obligation to promote autonomy, rather than
simply respecting it when it happens to exist. See DWYER, supra note 7, at 142-45. But
most Kantian moral and political theorists and most people in general who think autonomy
is the greatest manifestation of humanity take the position that we have an obligation to
promote development of autonomy. See, e.g., id. at 142-60; MEIRA LEVINSON, THE
DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION (1999). An appropriate use of the term autonomy in
connection with child rearing is to speak of the child's interest in becoming autonomous
and the obligation of parents, teachers, and the state to promote children's development
toward autonomy.
20 See infra note 23.
21 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881 (2013); Daniel
J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087 (2002).
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public controversy are mostly (though not all) 22 ones in which there is a
manifest or potential conflict of interests among family members and the state
is called on to address that conflict. And as to those issues, using autonomy or
privacy to gain the moral high ground is inappropriate.
One very common misuse of autonomy is to characterize parental control
over children.23 Parental autonomy is not only suspect as an attempt to disguise
abuse of power; it is, in fact, an oxymoron. It is conceptual nonsense, a linguis-
tic error. Autonomy means self-rule-that is, ruling oneself and one's own life.
From the Greek auto (self) and nomos (rule or law), autonomy is equivalent to
self-determination. The auto refers to both the source and the target of the
nomos; I am autonomous insofar as I am the source of the rules that I apply to
my governance of my own life-for example, what occupation I pursue, what
views I express, whether and where I worship. The term does not extend to
every choice I might wish to make or every action I might wish to take; it is not
the same as liberty or freedom or power. That is why it has more moral
purchase than those other terms. A claim to determine one's own life carries
much greater weight than a claim merely to be free to do what one wants or to
have power to control what or whom one wants to control. A claim to respect
for one's autonomy presumptively conflicts with no one else's autonomy or
22 A prominent exception is the same-sex marriage debate, in connection with which there
is an assumption that the members of the family-that is, the same-sex couple-both want
the same thing and would benefit equally from legal recognition.
23 See, e.g., Buss, supra note 8, at 296; Elaine M. Chiu, The Culture Differential in Parental
Autonomy, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773 (2007); id. at 1779 (stating that she will "use the
specific lens of parental autonomy" to critique disparity across subcultures within the
United States in "legal regulation of the parent-child relationship"); id. at 1784-86 (descri-
bing a so-called "right of parental autonomy"); Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grand-
parental) Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 9 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 74 (2001) (criticizing
third-party child visitation statutes that are "not defined in ways that meaningfully protect
parental autonomy"); id. at 89. 90, 91, 98, 108, 133; Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65
VAND. L. REV. 897, 912 (2012) ("laws authorizing postadoption sibling contact without an
adoptive parent's agreement may unconstitutionally infringe on the strong vision of parental
autonomy that Troxel endorsed"); Camille Gear Rich, Innocence Interrupted: Recon-
structing Fatherhood in the Shadow of Child Molestation Law, 101 CAL. L. REV. 609, 626
(2013) (referring to "clinicians and social workers ever eager to pathologize more conduct
and compromise parental autonomy"); Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Chil-
dren's Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1071 n.2, 1072-74 (2003); Lois A.
Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, Children's Relationships with Primary Care-
givers, and Child Protection Policy Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1497 (2012) ("To the
extent that our society seeks to protect, and perhaps encourage, diversity within its midst,
supporting some measure of parental autonomy in childrearing is sensible"); id. ("parental
autonomy is an inviolable component of liberty").
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rights, because no one else's autonomy could possibly include a say in my gov-
ernance of my own life and no one else is entitled to have my life go a particu-
lar way. My autonomous choice to be non-religious is "my business," we say.
In contrast, a claim to freedom and power carries no such empirical presump-
tion, because conceptually they can extend to conduct and choices that impinge
quite substantially and directly on central aspects of others' lives. I might wish
to have the freedom to take my neighbor's property or the power to fire a co-
worker.
Parental, on the other hand, means pertaining to parenting, and parenting
means child rearing-that is, acting upon and governing a child. Thus, if we
accept as a starting assumption that any child is a person ontologically distinct
from anyone else, including his or her biological or legal parents, then we must
recognize that parenting is inherently an "other-determining" activity and role.
It involves one person imposing rules on another person, and one person
treating another person in particular ways. It is quite clearly not an aspect of
self-determination for the parent, any more than is an employer's control of an
employee, a police officer's control of a motorist, or a husband's treatment of
his wife. Parenting and child rearing therefore can in no wise be exercises in
autonomy, and to speak of "parental autonomy" as something the state should
respect, protect, or promote is nonsense talk, just as would be speaking of a
husband's physical chastisement of his wife as an exercise of his autonomy. As
with non-regulation, use of this oxymoron is an obfuscation aimed at gaining
rhetorical advantage for the cause of legally protecting the freedom of more
powerful members of family relationships. 24 Those who oppose the measure of
parental power and freedom that is being sought using this term should not
tolerate the obfuscation.
The term privacy is generally not combined with parental but rather with
family. Conceptually, privacy is as fitting conjoined with parental as with
family, but "family privacy" sounds wholesome, whereas "parental privacy"
24 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1113 (1992) (arguing that parental
autonomy "stand[s] for the power to own another human being and to cast social regulation
of this power as an assault on freedom").
25 See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated
Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 461 ("In a robust model of
family privacy, states are limited in their ability to carve into parental rights and obliga-
tions"); Weithorn, supra note 23, at 1491("Out of respect for family privacy and parental
autonomy, the state avoids involvement in family affairs until or unless parents are viewed
as having failed their children in some extreme manner...").
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sounds sinister. The term autonomy is also often combined with family.26 Those
who argue for family privacy or family autonomy are not necessarily engaged
in nonsense speak; those can be (depending on what precise meaning is
intended) conceptually coherent terms even though a family is a group rather
than an individual. We commonly speak of groups having an interest in privacy
or exerting their autonomy as against outsiders. One sensible meaning of group
privacy is that members of the group can carry on their life within the group
free of interference or observation by outsiders. Group autonomy means the
group is able to establish its own rules for its internal affairs and to chart its
own collective course.2 7
The problem with applying privacy and autonomy to the group we call
family is therefore not inherently a conceptual one. It is rather that this applica-
tion frequently disguises at least these two important facts about families: First,
the decision-making process in families is generally not like that in other
private intermediate institutions, such as a fraternal organization, or in a state. It
is generally assumed that in their dealings with outsiders, social clubs or
legitimate governments have processes for making decisions about their needs
or wishes in which all constituents participate equally or are equally well
represented. Whereas that might be true of a family that contains only compe-
tent adults, it is not true of families containing non-autonomous persons, such
as young children. They typically do not participate in family decision making,
and family privacy and family autonomy are typically invoked precisely in
26 See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALl
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 5, 52 (2002)
(characterizing parental choices regarding allocation of childcare during intact marriages as
a matter of "parental autonomy," and urging state deference to those choices at the time of
divorce as a matter of respecting "family autonomy"); Margaret F. Brinig, Explaining
Abuse of the Disabled Child, 46 FAM. L.Q. 269, 280 (2012) (asserting that "family auto-
nomy ought to be the preferred approach in most cases" of child abuse); Shelley Kierstead,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Child Protection, 17 BARRY L. REV. 31, 32-33 (2011)
("The distinct nature of child protection matters necessarily embodies a tension between
family autonomy and the protection of children"); Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family
Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 598 (1992) (criticizing this
practice, calling parental privacy and family autonomy "unexamined platitudes [used] as
rationalizations for ignoring the developmental needs of children"). See also Cynthia
Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 165 (2013) ("A more
preventive or holistic approach to child maltreatment is sometimes criticized as an
impermissible invasion of family autonomy").
27 In this context of speaking about groups, though, we again see that autonomy is not
equivalent to freedom or power, but rather is limited in its meaning to self-governance. No
one would speak, for example, of Russia's former control of Afghanistan as a component of
its national autonomy.
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those situations when an outsider (usually the state) believes that the autono-
mous persons in the group (competent adults) cannot be viewed as representa-
tives of the non-autonomous persons in the group (children or incompetent
adults). Second, and related, there are within families many potential conflicts
of interests, especially conflicts between parents and children, which is why
parents often cannot be viewed as proxies for children in dealing with the
state.28
In most family law contexts, and especially parent-state conflicts over child
rearing, these two features of family life are prominent. The state wants some-
thing different from what parents want precisely because state actors believe
the children have interests contrary to what the parents want, and therefore the
parents do not adequately represent the children and the children's interests in
making decisions for the family. In such contexts, it is at best misleading to use
family autonomy as a rhetorical weapon against the state's position, just as it
would be misleading for a husband to assert family autonomy against state
efforts to stop him from battering his wife or for a nation's government to
assert national autonomy against efforts by an international body to stop that
government from committing human rights abuses against a vulnerable minor-
ity group. Most often, it seems, family autonomy serves to disguise the efforts
of powerful persons in a family to dominate weaker persons, to use the weaker
persons to serve the interests and aims of the more powerful.
It might even be conceptually flawed to use family autonomy in contexts of
internal conflict of interests, if it is the case that it is proper to apply the concept
of group autonomy only in situations when there is a unity of interests among
all members of the group in relation to the particular decision at issue. For
example, it might be linguistically appropriate for a church to assert its auton-
omy against the state's proposing to dictate when the church will hold its
services (for example, for the purpose of traffic control), but not against the
state's proposing to prosecute priests who sexually abuse children in the
congregation, even if the church leaders condone the abuse.
Group privacy is different from group autonomy. Privacy in one sense is
about insularity and secrecy, rather than about who decides things for the
28 Cf ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-221(E) (providing for court appointment of a lawyer and
guardian ad litem for a juvenile charged with delinquency when the court perceives a
conflict of interests between the juvenile and his or her parents); FLA. STAT. § 61.401
(authorizing separate legal representation in divorce cases and requiring it when there is an
allegation of parental maltreatment of a child); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/13(B)(a) (requiring
appointment of a lawyer to act as guardian ad litem for the child in adoption proceedings);
42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (federal law requiring state courts to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent children in all child protection proceedings).
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group. The concepts of insularity and secrecy are not at all incompatible with a
conflict of interests; their meaning does not entail or presuppose any unity of
interests or any particular decision-making regime. It is common and apt to say
that domestic violence and child abuse usually occur in private. In fact, state
actors might justifiably come to a conclusion in some situations that they
should forbear from acting to change people's behavior within a particular
family because of the value that privacy in this sense can have for families. No
parent's behavior is perfect and perfectly altruistic, and even when imperfec-
tion rises to the level of what some might consider abuse or neglect, the family
as a whole might be better off if left undisturbed. Having police or child protec-
tion agents come into the home and order a change of behavior, and in that way
intrude upon privacy, can have an adverse psychological and emotional impact
on everyone, and all members of a family might be better off, on the whole, if
the state actors did not do that.
Nevertheless, invocation of family privacy in support of normative argu-
ments in family law is usually mischievous. It usually appears in opposition to
state measures aimed at protecting weaker family members from harmful
behavior or choices of more powerful family members,29 and it has moral
purchase not when it conveys the meanings of secrecy and hiddenness but
rather when it conveys one or both of two other ideas-namely, family auto-
nomy or separate spheres. When people invoke family privacy, they typically
do not mean to give the impression that they think powerful family members
should be able to do what they want in secret, behind a dark curtain. We do not
usually attribute great independent value to the possibility of people being able
to do things to each other without anyone else finding out about it. An
exception is mutually voluntary intimate conduct between autonomous adults,
as reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court's early privacy decisions, such as
Griswold and Eisenstadt.30 A demand for family privacy in the context of
29 See Fernanda G. Nicola, Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law, and
Stereotyped Narratives in Interspousal Torts, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 445, 472
(2013) ("The notion that family privacy, and consequently its harmony, is threatened by
interspousal torts has been widely used by courts since the beginning of the twentieth
century as a way to push back against the elimination of interspousal immunities").
30 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating on equal protection grounds
state law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, and stating: "If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
85 (1965) (invalidating law prohibiting use of contraceptives as applied to married couples,
and stating that the marital relationship lies "within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees").
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children's schooling is not much like a demand for privacy in the context of
spouses using contraceptives. Concealment is a positive and inherent aspect of
marital intimacy but not of educating children.
Instead, what people really mean when they assert family privacy in con-
flicts with the state over family life or children's upbringing is leaving the
family alone to do as it wishes. They mean to suggest that the family is in a
separate sphere, jurisdictionally other, entitled to act autonomously, a necessary
and healthy counterpart to the impersonal and heartless state and market, the
site of true human flourishing so long as it remains untainted by the gaze and
touch of the state and the market.
And most of that is bunk. There is something to this idea; family relation-
ships are special in some sense, different from the relationships between co-
workers and between citizens per se. There is an important kind of human
flourishing that takes place only within family relationships, and for that to
happen there needs to be space and time where only the family members are
physically present and they have practical freedom to interact and express
themselves as they wish. But I have already explained why it is wrong to think
that there are any human relationships untouched by the law, unregulated by
the state, occurring in a purely private realm. The parent-child relationship in
particular is one that owes its existence to state action and state decisions,
concerning who will be in the relationships and what power over children the
parental role will entail. When the state opposes some parental choice or beha-
vior, the contest is not really one between privacy, in the sense of the family
being in a separate sphere, and public intrusion, for the same reason it is not a
contest between regulation and non-regulation and is not really about family
autonomy. The real question is generally what legal (that is, state-conferred)
license and power do parents enjoy with respect to children, and any answer to
that question entails the state's involving itself in the parent-child relationship.
Thus, for example, to argue that the state should not prohibit corporal
punishment because this would intrude on family privacy is nonsensical and
deceptive. It actually amounts to arguing that the state should intrude into the
private lives of children to the dramatic extent of withdrawing from them a
right against violent incursions on their bodies that they otherwise would
possess simply as persons, and which they do have against people who are not
their parents. Similarly, opposition to state laws prohibiting nonconsensual
harmful conduct by one spouse against another or dictating what decision-
making power one spouse has with respect to the person or property of the
other does not really present a contest between privacy and state intrusion. The
state must license and empower or prohibit and disable. The state is present in
either case; there is necessarily a legal framework to family life. As with
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autonomy, participants in family debates invoke privacy to make one kind of
state decision, one allocation of legal license and power, appear more attractive
than another, for an entirely illusory reason. It is a mischaracterization that
distorts moral and political discourse.31
III. CONCLUSION
I recommend that we largely eliminate regulation, intervention, autonomy, and
privacy from our family law vocabulary. As suggested above, there are family
contexts, principally involving only autonomous adults whose wishes and
interests are unified, in which the terms autonomy and privacy might be apt.
32
But all these terms appear routinely in contexts where they are inapt, even
incoherent. And they are certainly unnecessary to almost any family law
discussion. For the sake of greater honesty and accuracy in our discourse, I
suggest we use other terms. If one believes parents should have plenary legal
power to decide what sort of schooling their children receive, then use the
terms power or control rather than nonintervention or parental autonomy. If
one believes the state should not periodically visit the homes of parents the
state knows are religiously opposed to medical care, to make sure any young
children in the home are in good health, one can use terms like unmonitored
custody or right to seclusion instead of family privacy. Nothing is lost
analytically in using the former terms in each example, so anyone who feels
like they stand on weaker ground using those terms rather than the latter should
think about why that is so, and whether they need misleading rhetoric to make
their views appear plausible.
31 For further critique of the concept of family privacy and the supposed public-private
dichotomy, see Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (2013);
Olsen, supra note 2; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247, 1261-62 (1999).
32 It is also coherent and useful to speak of any individual within a family having an interest
in privacy, in the sense of concealment, as against another family member. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Shmueli & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Privacy for Children, 42 COLuM. HuM. RTS.
L. REV. 759 (2011).
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